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This paper investigates the relationship between market position and the adoption of IT-enabled process 
innovations.  Prior research has focused overwhelmingly on product innovation and garnered mixed 
empirical support. I extend the literature into the understudied area of business process innovation, 
developing a framework for classifying innovations based on the complexity, interdependence, and 
customer impact of the underlying business process. I test the framework’s predictions in the context of e-
buying and e-selling adoption. Leveraging detailed U.S. Census data, I find robust evidence that market 
leaders were significantly more likely to adopt the incremental innovation of e-buying but 
commensurately less likely to adopt the more radical practice of e-selling. The findings highlight the 
strategic significance of adjustment costs and co-invention capabilities in technology adoption, 
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1.  Introduction 
The adoption of new technologies is central to how firms compete, grow, and change over time. 
Since the pioneering work of Joseph Schumpeter (1934, 1942), scholars have explored why certain 
innovations are adopted quickly by market leaders while others are ignored or absorbed only slowly. A 
principal tradition in the literature points to the need for a match between the nature of the technological 
change and the attributes of the firm. This work proposes that new technologies can be misaligned with a 
firm’s technological or market competencies, hindering adoption. If misalignment is more prevalent 
amongst larger incumbents, this would explain the observed failure of healthy firms to maintain their 
technological – and potentially, competitive – advantage over time. This, in turn, has deep implications 
for market structure and firm strategy in the face of technological change. 
A useful framework for considering the alignment between technological requirements and 
organizational capabilities focuses on the extent to which an innovation is “incremental” or “radical” for 
an adopting firm.  According to this perspective, incremental change that reinforces the strategic and 
organizational advantages of incumbents ought to be more readily adopted by market leaders. Larger 
incumbents enjoy greater incentives (due in part to economies of scale) as well as greater ability (due to 
better-established routines, knowledge, and capabilities) to succeed at incremental innovation In contrast, 
radical changes that threaten existing strategic positions and demand entirely new knowledge and 
capabilities ought to be less attractive and accessible to leading incumbents. Specifically, the very 
organizational features that are associated with market success also tend to generate higher adjustment 
costs and greater economic and organizational risks for large incumbents adopting radical innovations. 
A large theoretical literature in both economics and strategy has leveraged this contrast between 
incremental and radical innovation to explore leading firms’ responses to innovative opportunities. Yet, 
empirical evidence remains mixed. While support for the incremental-radical distinction has been found 
in some small, single-industry studies, large-scale, multi-industry evidence has been harder to acquire.  
In addition, the scope of the theory remains unclear. Both theoretical and empirical innovation 
research has focused overwhelmingly on product innovation, with some attention to manufacturing 
processes. The extent to which these constructs apply to business process innovation has not been fully 
explored to date –despite the growing importance of this activity in the modern economy.  
The goal of this paper is to make both theoretical and empirical headway by examining how 
market leadership influences firm propensity to adopt new IT-enabled business process innovations. The 
theoretical contribution centers on extending hypotheses of incremental versus radical innovation into the 
important but understudied context of business process innovation. I develop a framework for classifying 
innovations as “incremental” or “radical” based on: 1) the underlying complexity of the business process 
to be affected, 2) its interdependence with other firm activities, and 3) its impact on customers.    3
Combining this framework with arguments from existing research, I motivate two core 
predictions. Large incumbents ought to excel at so-defined incremental business process innovation, but 
they will face disproportionate challenges in pursuing radical changes. I integrate this framework with a 
detailed qualitative analysis of two new IT-enabled business process innovations – e-buying and e-selling 
– to establish a theoretically and intuitively sound basis for the empirical tests to follow. 
The empirical contribution comes from leveraging a unique data set with several desirable 
properties. The first is broad industry coverage. The data come from a U.S. Census Bureau survey of over 
35,000 plants in 86 different manufacturing industries. This offers a window onto IT-enabled process 
innovation amongst an unusually comprehensive sample of firms. Secondly, the setting captures reactions 
of the same firms at the same time to both incremental and radical innovations. I can thus directly 
compare leaders’ reactions to the two types of business process innovation, highlighting the incremental-
radical distinction while controlling for unobserved influences on the investment decision. In addition, the 
richness of the data permits robust controls for other important firm and industry characteristics. Finally, 
the data also capture elusive organizational features that relate to the underlying theory, allowing me to 
test not only the main predictions but also supporting conjectures about the precise behavioral 
mechanisms involved.  
A side-by-side comparison of the adoption of e-buying and e-selling during the early diffusion of 
the commercial internet constitutes my primary test of the theory. While both shared many technological 
requirements and imposed changes in business-to-business operations, they diverged dramatically along 
the dimensions outlined in the framework. E-buying entailed the electronic procurement of highly 
standardized materials such as office and maintenance supplies that, while impacting the cost structure of 
the firm, posed limited economic and organizational risks for adopters. E-selling, by contrast, governed a 
far greater complexity of products, interacted with core functions such as marketing and customer 
management, and generated significant customer resistance and channel conflict. Mapping these 
differences onto the framework provides a compelling argument that e-buying represented incremental 
change, while e-selling embodied the central elements of a radical business process innovation. 
I find strong evidence consistent with this framework and its attendant hypotheses. In this large 
and diverse sample of manufacturers, those with the greatest market shares, sales, and profits were 
significantly more likely to adopt e-buying, with the opposing result in the case of e-selling. These 
findings are robust to various alternative explanations that are also testable with the rich Census data.   
Understanding when leading firms will fail to embrace new technologies is critical to 
understanding the evolution of industrial competition.  Much of our current appreciation for the 
competitive implications of innovation centers on the behavior of firms that produce new technologies. 
However, an important process of adaptation and complementary innovation – or “co-invention” – takes   4
places when firms adopt new general purpose technologies – including, but not limited to, modern 
information technology. Thus, it becomes essential to consider whether firms might be able to gain or 
retain competitive advantages by leveraging technology to innovate in their internal processes – and 
whether the capabilities to do so reside predominantly among market leaders or smaller rivals. 
This paper contributes to our understanding in this area by providing robust, multi-industry 
evidence consistent with the notion that alignment (or lack thereof) between the requirements of a 
technology and a firm’s organizational capabilities can explain why large firms readily adopt and adapt 
certain technologies and not others.  In addition, it gleans this evidence from a class of innovative 
behavior that is both understudied in the literature and increasingly important in today’s high-tech 
economy. Finally, it develops a theoretical framework that: 1) establishes links between existing theory 
and this novel context and 2) carefully outlines the behavioral mechanism in a way that deepens our 
understanding of the phenomenon and  enables corroborating empirical testing.  
These findings have important practical implications. Being able to apply our intuition about the 
innovative behavior of firms requires the means to distinguish, ex ante, whether a proposed change lies on 
the incremental or radical end of the spectrum. The theory and evidence presented in this paper indicate 
that, in cases where firms must coordinate complex and interdependent activities throughout a larger 
organization – particularly while interacting with customers – adoption will tend to take place among 
smaller firms. This intra- and inter-firm coordination challenge is an important strategic consideration as 
businesses grow more dependent on both new technology and the performance of their supply chain 
partners. As this technology advances, leading firms may face increasing challenges from smaller rivals 
who better exploit internal and business-to-business process innovation to their competitive advantage. 
2.  Literature and Theoretical Context 
2.1   Overview 
A rich body of work in both economic and organizational theory addresses the question of how 
incumbent firms with large market shares will react to –and participate in –technological change.  While 
the inquiry dates back at least to Schumpeter (1934, 1942), Arrow’s seminal (1962) theory that existing 
monopolists will resist innovating so as to avoid cannibalizing existing sales sparked a surge of research 
into the effects of market structure and firm size on innovative activity (see reviews by Kamien and 
Schwartz 1982, Baldwin and Scott 1987, and Gilbert 2006, among others). 
Economics research in this vein emphasizes the strategic benefits to market leaders of 
maintaining their dominant position in the face of technological change. Because a large firm with market 
power will enjoy higher rents per unit of sales, it will have greater marginal incentive to protect that 
power. Thus, market leaders will, in many circumstances, be more likely to invest in technology that   5
allows them to lower costs and price more aggressively in the product market (Sutton 1991) or to 
otherwise pre-empt entry in the first place (Gilbert and Newbery 1982).
1   
In the specific case of process innovation, economic theory suggests that basic economies of scale 
will increase the benefits of innovation for larger firms relative to smaller ones (Cohen and Klepper 1996, 
Klepper 1996). Barring any adjustment costs that might also increase disproportionately with firm size 
(Athey and Schmutzler 2001), market leaders will enjoy higher net benefits from process innovation.  
Yet the adjustment costs associated with adopting new technologies are often not trivial. The 
history of industrial evolution is littered with firms that were unable to maintain their leadership position 
in the wake of technological change. A principal explanation is that, even in situations where they enjoy 
greater incentive to innovate, leaders may vary in their ability to embrace new innovative opportunities 
(Henderson 1993, Arora et al. 2009). In particular, the alignment between the incentives and abilities of 
leading firms is argued to vary systematically according to characteristics of the innovations themselves. 
2.2  Incremental vs. Radical Innovation 
According to a rich organizational theory literature, leaders will excel at adopting innovations that 
build upon their existing knowledge and capabilities. Labeling this category of innovation is delicate, 
because: 1) innovative activity lies on a multi-dimensional spectrum, 2) a wide range of labels address 
these important dimensions, and 3) significant ambiguity in definitions persists (Gatignon et al. 2002). 
Nevertheless, for over 35 years, the most accessible type of innovative activity has often been described 
as “incremental” (e.g., Nelson and Winter 1982 through to Gatignon, et al. 2002), capturing the essential 
idea that certain types of innovation entail lower economic and/or organizational risks for adopting firms.  
Much of the organizational theory literature argues that firms tend to develop routines (Nelson 
and Winter 1982) and information filters (Arrow 1974) based on prior experience that embody 
organizational knowledge and condition how they react to changes in their environments. As a result, 
greater experience gained over a larger scale of activity and/or over time will make it easier for larger 
incumbents to identify and pursue innovations that build on existing knowledge and competencies 
(Abernathy and Clark 1985, Tushman and Anderson 1986). Larger firms may also have invested more in 
resources (Wernerfelt 1984) capabilities (Barney 1991) or complementary assets (Tripsas 1997) that 
enable them to effectively exploit incremental advances. Thus, leading firms will often be not only more 
willing, but also more able to pursue incremental innovations than their smaller, less-established rivals.  
On the other end of the spectrum are “radical” innovations. Again, this term is more convenient 
than encompassing given a variety of ways to characterize the misalignment between a technology’s 
requirements and an organization’s ability to meet them. Typically, radical innovations require 
                                                      
1 Athey and Schmutzler (2001) develop a very general model that predicts leading firms will be more likely to 
invest under a wide range of common modeling assumptions.   6
dramatically new knowledge on the part of the adopting firm (Dewar and Dutton 1986, Gatignon et al. 
2002) or accelerate the obsolescence of the existing knowledge base (Reinganum 1983). They may 
demand entirely new competencies from firms to operate and exploit the new technology (Tushman and 
Anderson 1986). A critical consideration is how changes to the linkages amongst product attributes 
(Henderson and Clark 1990) or between the firm and its customer base (Abernathy and Clark 1985) can 
demand new ways of processing information and communicating both within and between firms.  
The literature on radical innovation emphasizes that, while these innovations are often more 
challenging for all incumbents, they may, under many circumstances, be disproportionately more difficult 
for the largest organizations. To begin, larger firms may have lower incentives to invest if the new 
innovation replaces existing revenue streams (Arrow 1962). These “economically radical” (Henderson 
1993) innovations thus present higher opportunity costs to leaders (although the ultimate impact depends 
on market entry and the degree of product market competition – see Gilbert and Newbery 1982).  
Most prominent explanations for the resistance of large incumbents to radical innovation focus on 
organizational abilities (or lack thereof), and why acquiring new ones is particularly challenging for the 
largest firms. The routines, filters, resources and capabilities that propelled a firm to succeed in the first 
place tend to become less valuable or even obsolete under radical innovation. Core competencies may 
become “core rigidities” during radical change (Leonard-Barton 1992). Firms focused on an existing 
customer base (Christensen 1997) or research trajectory (Tripsas and Gavetti 2000) may fail to even 
recognize their misalignment with a new technological reality. Or, they may find the effort of developing 
new knowledge, routines and resources too costly (Arrow 1974) or too risky (Hannan and Freeman, 
1984). Thus, the diffusion of radical innovation often comes at the expense of incumbent firms. 
2.4   Mixed Empirical Evidence 
While widely cited and conceptually compelling, the importance of distinguishing incremental 
innovations from radical ones has received limited empirical support. The extensive body of empirical 
work addressing the response of market leaders to new technological opportunities has been described as 
“notable for its inconclusiveness” (Cohen and Levin 1989). While more recent studies (e.g., Blundell et 
al. 1999) have made econometric advances, the literature has been criticized for failing to account for 
underlying industry heterogeneity and for confounding product and process innovation (Gilbert 2006). 
Moreover, the fundamental distinction between incremental and radical types of innovation has 
yet to find broad-based empirical confirmation. Progress has been made, with meaningful differences 
established in single-industry settings such as food packaging (Ettlie et al. 1984), footwear manufacturing 
(Dewar and Dutton 1986), and the photolithographic alignment equipment industry (Henderson 1993). 
However, the incremental-radical distinction finds no support in the only multi-industry empirical work to 
consider the issue to date (Blundell et al. 1999).    7
One reason for the lack of compelling cross-industry evidence may be the challenge that 
empirical researchers face in classifying innovative activity as either incremental or radical, ex ante, 
across a wide range of industry settings (i.e., without referring to the institutional details of a particular 
industry or product market). A key goal of this paper is to advance a framework for predicting how 
leading firms will react to technological innovations across a wide range of industry settings  
2.5   Product vs. Process Innovation 
A central challenge to this goal is the need to extend hypotheses found in the traditional literature 
into the novel setting of business processes. Existing research has focused overwhelmingly on the 
invention and commercialization of new products.  Process innovation, in general, has received far less 
attention (Rosenberg 1982) – particularly in the scholarly literature. Business process innovation, has 
received even less, despite featuring prominently in firm investment and strategy over the past 20 years.  
This class of innovative activity warrants more attention in light of theory and evidence that 
process innovation may differ in important ways from product innovation. Factors external to the firm 
such as product lifecycles (Utterback and Abernathy 1975), competitive pressure (Boone 2000) or 
customer requirements (Adner and Levinthal 2001) may emphasize one over the other in certain cases.  
Internal factors such as scale of output (Cohen and Klepper 1996, Klepper 1996) and organizational 
routines and priorities (Henderson et al. 1998) may also push firms along different innovation paths.  
This sheds doubt on the extent to which we can automatically apply theory developed to describe 
product innovation to processes, and, in particular, to business processes. Works that specifically address 
incumbent response to process innovation tend to equate it with incremental change (e.g., Cohen and 
Klepper 1996, Klepper 1996, Boone 2000). Exceptions include Abernathy and Clark (1985), Tushman 
and Anderson (1986), Dewar and Dutton (1986), and Sull et al. (1997). However, they are largely based 
on industry-specific anecdotes and focus overwhelmingly on manufacturing processes.  
3. Theoretical  Framework 
3.1  Business Process Innovation Defined 
Business process innovation requires different knowledge and organizational skills from those 
demanded by product or manufacturing process innovation. Thus, it is important to be precise about what 
it entails – and what demands it makes of organizations.  
The diffusion of the commercial internet in the 1990s created a new opportunity to transform and 
automate a wide variety of processes both within and between firms. The slogan of the business process 
reengineering movement was “Don’t Automate, Obliterate!” (Hammer, 1990), exhorting firms to exploit 
new technologies to create completely new business practices. Innovative ways of linking information 
and execution within operating processes held – and continue to hold – the potential to dramatically   8
improve firm performance. Moreover, because business process innovation is difficult for competitors to 
observe, much less imitate, it offers the potential for generating sustainable competitive advantages.  
The challenge, however, arises when novel operational knowledge is demanded in the 
transformation process and existing routines are replaced with unproven techniques. In particular, there is 
a parallel invention – or “co-invention” (Bresnahan and Greenstein 1996) – imperative that must be met. 
On the one hand, firms must develop or acquire the correct technology (primarily software) to support the 
new way(s) of doing business. On the other hand, adopters often must design new business processes and 
supporting organizational structures to conform to the technology’s constraints. Because these interrelated 
demands can create misalignment between a firm’s existing capabilities and those required to implement 
the new technology, adopters may be required to develop or acquire entirely new knowledge and skills to 
access the technological opportunities.  
Even without dramatic process change, automation by itself can present significant organizational 
challenges. A primary benefit of automation is the guarantee that a particular process flow will be 
executed with speed and consistency for every related transaction. Through automation, innovative ideas 
can be diffused more rapidly throughout an entire organization with high fidelity, generating significant 
benefits (Brynjolfsson et al. 2008).  However, because automation requires standardized operational 
practices and modalities of communication, it requires planning, communication, and negotiation amongst 
users to decide what those standards should be. Even relatively simple change often proves to be 
disruptive to existing routines and organizational structures, increasing pressure to “get it right the first 
time” and often generating internal conflicts and implementation delays (Edmondson et al. 2001).  
3.2  Classifying Business Process Innovations 
The challenges of business process innovation will tend to be exacerbated when the underlying 
business process is more complex, when it shares more interdependencies with other functions within the 
firm, and when it has a high impact on customers.  Under these circumstances, the misalignment between 
old and new knowledge and capabilities is most likely to generate the types of organizational and 
economic risks that characterize radical innovation in more well-known settings (see Section 2). 
Complexity 
To begin, changes to more complex firm processes require more advanced organizational and 
procedural knowledge than do simpler adjustments. Intuitively, optimizing internal business processes 
and supporting technology for more complex routines and organizational structures demands more 
sophisticated operational know-how as well as more informational input from across the firm. As a result, 
more complex business process innovations require greater managerial skill and within-firm coordination.    9
Empirically, prior research confirms that the costs of creating alignment between new information 
technology and the adopting organization through “co-invention” tend to be systematically higher 
wherever there are more complex processes involved (Bresnahan and Greenstein, 1996).  
Interdependence 
  The product innovation literature has noted the challenges that arise when interdependencies 
between product components, i.e., the “product architecture,” are affected. This understanding of how 
components are linked becomes embedded in the structure of an organization, making changes to these 
linkages particularly destructive for established firms (Henderson and Clark 1990). 
The analog in the business process setting is the set of activities that are operationally 
interdependent within the firm. Changes to a business process that is tightly coupled with others risks 
disrupting inter-process linkages, and, hence, the performance of the whole. As a result, changes to one 
process may require complementary innovation in other processes or other areas of the firm (Milgrom and 
Roberts 1990). This raises the stakes in terms of the amount of knowledge and coordination required to 
implement the change – as well as the likelihood and costs of failure.  In the case of the new internet-
enabled process innovations, reductions in process times and other buffers such as work-in-process or 
finished goods inventory tend to further tighten the couplings among different operations, making change 
in one area even more risky overall (Brynjolfsson, Renshaw and Van Alstyne, 1997). 
Impact on Customers 
Internal linkages are not the only challenge, however – external linkages matter, as well. A final 
dimension of this classification concerns the impact of the business process on customers. Managing 
change within an organization is sufficiently challenging when the primary stakeholders function within 
the boundaries of the same firm. In this case, hierarchy and shared culture will tend to facilitate both 
decision-making and the implementation of new interdependent processes. These advantages do not exist, 
however, when business processes cross firm boundaries. When essential firm activities require tight 
integration with other members of the value chain, the costs and risks associated with redesigning them 
increase dramatically.  The greater the number or intensity of inter-firm linkages, the greater the difficulty 
of managing the business process change (Davenport, 1993). 
Taken together, differing degrees of complexity, interdependence, and impact on customers can 
usefully distinguish different business process innovations from each other in terms of the organizational 
and economic risk they entail. While perhaps not exhaustive, these criteria provide robust guidelines for 
placing a variety of business process innovations on the continuum between incremental and radical, 
facilitating clear predictions about how market leaders might respond to their introduction.    10
3.3  Predicting the Behavior of Market Leaders  
As detailed in Section 2, prior work suggests that large incumbents will enjoy distinct advantages 
in the case of incremental innovation – and the opposite when it comes to more radical advances. While 
this prior literature has focused primarily on the production of new technologies, certain core arguments 
apply quite naturally to the adoption of new technologies – particularly in the case of the large-scale or 
strategically sensitive business process innovation, where adoption of even “off-the-shelf” solutions 
typically entails significant co-invention of complementary activities within the firm, not to mention the 
coordination challenges involved in selection and implementation of the supporting IT infrastructure. 
For instance, the same economies of scale that make fixed investments in R&D  profitable for the 
producers of innovations will likewise improve the returns to fixed investments in adoption and 
adaptation: e.g., researching and licensing new technologies, customizing solutions to match internal 
needs, investing in new organizational capabilities, user training, etc.  These advantages will apply to both 
incremental and radical business process innovations, conditional on sufficient fixed investment up front. 
However, a central argument of this paper is that some or all of the size advantages in business 
process innovation may be overwhelmed by the opportunity costs and organizational risks entailed by 
disrupting existing routines, within-firm linkages, and supply chain relationships.  Because these 
organizational risks are, by definition, low for incremental innovation, it is straightforward to sign the 
expected relationship between firm size and incremental business process innovation:  
Hypothesis 1: Firms with larger market shares will be disproportionately more likely to adopt 
incremental business process innovations, all else equal.  
By contrast, in the case of radical innovation, the largest incumbents will have the greatest value 
at stake, have more-established operating procedures subject to disruption, and face higher internal and 
external coordination costs. For these reasons, the organizational risks will tend to overwhelm the 
economic benefits for larger firms and the economic benefits themselves may diminish as the costs of 
cannibalization and customer disruption increase (e.g., Arrow 1962). Thus:  
Hypothesis 2: Firms with larger market shares will be systematically less likely to adopt radical 
business process innovations, all else equal.  
Note that these predictions differ depending on the characteristics of the innovations themselves 
(incremental vs. radical), and the demands they make on large incumbent firms. However, it is useful to 
consider certain characteristics of the organizations themselves that may generate similar effects. 
  First consider organizational structure. While greater size and sheer organizational inertia tend 
to make procedural complexity a hurdle to radical innovation for larger firms, organizational or   11
operational complexity will also tend to exacerbate the knowledge and coordination challenges involved. 
These types of complexity are easily confounded with firm size, because larger firms typically operate in 
more lines of business and are dispersed across more operating establishments (see Table 3). While this 
correlation does not change the core predictions outlined above, if complexity is truly a key criterion for 
making a business process innovation more challenging, then separate measures of organizational or 
operational complexity ought to have their own negative associations with the adoption of radical 
business process innovations:  
Hypothesis 2a: Organizational or operational complexity will be negatively correlated with the 
adoption of radical business process innovations. 
Similarly, the degree to which a firm engages in vertically or horizontally integrated production 
will influence the need for coordination amongst its various business processes (McElheran 2010). Again, 
while this is a somewhat bigger issue for larger firms (and hence possibly confounded with size), if 
interdependence makes a proposed change more radical, this effect should also manifest separately: 
Hypothesis 2b: Greater operational interdependence will be negatively correlated with the 
adoption of radical business process innovations. 
To the extent that these characteristics can be empirically disentangled from firm size or market 
share per se, it becomes possible not only to test the main hypotheses, but also to confirm two of the key 
mechanisms proposed in the framework. The rich data that makes this possible is described in Section 5.  
The third criterion in determining the “radicalness” of a business process innovation – customer 
impact – is more challenging to disentangle from size, per se. Ideally, one would be able to measure 
variation amongst firms in the “total customer impact” – defined as impact per customer multiplied by the 
number of customers. However, firms with the largest market shares have, by definition, more customers 
and/or more sales per customer than smaller rivals. Lacking data on the suppliers and customers of the 
subject firms, justification for this final element of the framework rests primarily on the qualitative 
analysis to follow. 
4.   Phenomenon: E-Business 
  The explosion of new business processes enabled by the diffusion of the commercial internet in 
the late 1990s offers a rich empirical setting with the needed variation in both innovations and firm 
characteristics to identify the effects of interest. For simplicity and ease of mapping the practical 
applications to the theoretical framework, I restrict my focus to the use of new internet-based technologies 
to conduct business-to-business (B2B) purchases and sales online: i.e., e-buying and e-selling.   12
It is worth noting that, in addition to its usefulness for theory-testing, the setting is interesting in 
and of itself. IT adoption represents an economically significant and nuanced phenomenon that is 
incompletely characterized by common measures of investment. Firm investment in information process 
equipment and software rose from roughly $200 billion in the early 1990s to over $500 billion in recent 
years (U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis). Industry analysts and observers estimate that more than half 
of such investment has taken place in “process-enabling information technology” (McAfee 2003). 
However, aggregate measures of IT investment or even adoption data on particular platforms or 
applications gloss over important differences in the impacts of these general-purpose technologies on 
adopters. To fully grasp IT’s influence on firms and corporate strategy, one needs to understand how it is 
actually adapted and implemented by firms in their core activities (Fichman and Kemerer 1999, Kahl 
2007). An advantage of this study, therefore, is the opportunity to observe how new internet-based IT has 
been applied to important and well-specified business uses – offering a rare window into how businesses 
can leverage technology in difficult-to-observe ways that have meaningful repercussions for their 
operational performance and long-term competitive outcomes.  
4.1  E-Buying vs. E-Selling in the late 1990s:  Incremental vs. Radical Innovation  
While internet-based e-buying and e-selling shared a common technology platform, they actually 
addressed fundamentally different business practices in the late 1990s. These differences (which have 
been ignored in most scholarly studies of e-business
2), provide the essential variation needed to classify e-
buying and e-selling as incremental or radical according to the framework described in Section 3. 
It is important to note that, while the focus of this paper is on frontier e-business practices relying 
on the internet for their electronic platform, Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) has existed since the 1970s 
to allow businesses to exchange documents such as purchase orders and invoices. For firms that already 
had EDI, the internet presented both the opportunity and risk of redesigning existing firm-to-firm 
transactions.
 Because this legacy technology represents a potential substitute for the new internet-based 
practices, I address the potential impact of EDI in the empirical analysis (see section 7). 
E-Buying 
 Early e-buying applications were focused on enabling online procurement of maintenance, 
repair, and operations (MRO) goods such as lubricant, spare parts, office supplies, etc. – i.e., anything 
consumed in the production process not directly put into finished goods.  This indirect procurement 
centers on spot transactions involving highly standardized goods and is distinct from the procurement of 
                                                      
2 E-commerce has garnered increasing attention, particularly in the information systems literature (Straub et al. 
2002, Zhu and Kraemer 2002). Yet there has been very little attention paid to heterogeneity in the technologies and 
business practices subsumed by labels such as “e-commerce” or “e-business”. The unique exception I know of is 
Hollenstein and Woerter (2008), although their finding that e-buying and e-selling share the same drivers of 
adoption stands in sharp contrast to what I find in the United States three years prior to their sample timeframe.   13
specialized materials and parts for direct use in production (appropriately termed direct procurement). 
While cost savings from electronic indirect procurement can be significant – upwards of 70% per 
purchase (AMR Research 1999a) – it is a self-contained activity for the typical manufacturing plant. 
Direct procurement, on the other hand, tends to involve a much greater diversity of items with 
much greater impact on core production processes. This complexity and interdependency would surely 
place innovations to direct procurement closer to the radical end of the spectrum. At the time of the 
Census survey, however, software solutions for direct purchasing over the internet were not widely 
available.
3  Thus, all observed internet e-buying at the time of the study entailed the much simpler 
indirect procurement process. 
E-Selling 
In sharp contrast to e-buying, early e-selling applications focused primarily on finished goods 
(e.g., computers, clothing, consumer packaged goods, etc.) for sale to distribution partners and end users. 
As a result, these solutions tended to be more varied and far more complicated to implement for nearly all 
firms – in short, they were highly complex. In particular, they required a great deal of tailoring to the 
idiosyncrasies of the adopting firm and its trading partners. According to one analyst report at the time: 
“What the projects lack in simplicity they make up for with diversity,” (AMR Research 199b). 
Therefore, the demands of innovating in the selling process presented potential adopters with two 
costly alternatives:  replace existing core processes with standardized “off the shelf” functionality from 
mainstream vendors, or else invest heavily in customization or developing their own e-selling software 
based on their existing business process requirements. Because these processes often embody key aspects 
of what firms consider to be their competitive advantage, the majority chose a hybrid approach involving 
both a high level of customization of available products and some business process reengineering (AMR 
1999b) – i.e., a high level of “co-invention.” A recurring theme among industry observers at the time was 
the significant cost in terms of time and money required to undertake the complex internal coordination 
and customization required to implement new e-selling processes.
4  
Another striking characteristic of e-selling is that the goods and services governed by the new 
electronic processes involve multiple locations and functions throughout the firm. The pressure to create 
and maintain a unified “online presence” requires that entire product families (often produced at separate 
                                                      
3 At the time, Ariba, Commerce One and similar vendors of “procurement” applications had well-defined offerings 
for MRO procurement. Firms such as Mercado and QRS specialized in meeting the needs of retailers to manage the 
flow of finished goods and had begun to extend their offerings into manufacturing. But very little headway had been 
made in terms of offering a solution that could effectively manage direct procurement (AMR Research 1999b). 
 
4 Even the notable successes, such as the launch of milpro.com by tool-manufacturer Milacron, Inc., were strikingly 
expensive.  The firm spent a dollar in customization and consulting for every dollar of the software license, involved 
more than 120 people from across the company, and required 10 months to launch (Schultz 1999, Teach 1999).    14
plants within the firm) and related services need to be supported by one comprehensive website. The 
inability to move products online in a piecemeal fashion generates interdependencies among even the 
most autonomous units within a firm. In addition, e-selling interacts with strategically sensitive business 
functions focused on brand image and customer relationship management. This requires coordination 
with complementary business activities from many different areas of the company.  
E-selling also significantly impacts customers and customer interactions. As part of the 
implementation process, a firm and its trading partners must collaborate on what the online sales process 
should look like, what types of data ought to be exchanged, and where control for certain activities will 
lie. Yet determining how transactions and process flows should operate as they cross the firm boundary 
opens up existing contracts for renegotiation and often proves to be a risky and challenging undertaking 
(Davenport 1993). Online sales also often replace some fraction of offline transactions – particularly in 
the early stages of adoption while firms explore how to conduct business over the internet with their 
existing customers (AMR 1999b). Channel conflict was cited as the number-one concern of firms 
considering online sales at the time (Gilbert and Bacheldor 2000). All of these costs tend to scale with the 
size of a firm’s operations (Davenport 1993). 
Thus, early e-buying innovations allowed firms to cut costs in a relatively straightforward way 
with little organizational or economic risk. E-selling, in contrast, represented a far more radical 
innovation according to the classification developed in Section 3. These critical qualitative differences 
between the two business process innovations are reflected in the descriptive statistics on e-buying and e-
selling adoption presented in the next section, where e-buying enjoyed a somewhat higher degree of 
diffusion. The empirical test of interest, however, is to see whether e-selling was differentially more 
problematic for market leaders than for smaller rivals, influencing not only the speed but the distribution 
of adoption in ways that have strategic implications. This is the focus of the remainder of the paper. 
5. DATA 
5.1  Business Uses of the Internet 
The dependent variables capturing the uses of new internet technology by firms come from the 
Computer Network Use Supplement (CNUS) included in the U.S. Census Bureau’s 1999 Annual Survey 
of Manufactures. The approximately 35,000 plants in the sample accounted for more than 50% of 
manufacturing employment and output in the U.S. at the time. They belonged to more than 20,000 firms 
in 86 different manufacturing industries, providing data across a wide range of market contexts.  
The CNUS contains detailed information on plant adoption of a variety of e-business practices 
and supporting technologies. In particular, plants identify whether or not they place or accept orders over   15
a network and whether the primary network for doing so is the internet. Establishments that report online 
purchases primarily over the internet are coded as having adopted e-buying, similarly for e-selling.
5 
Summary Statistics  
According to this snapshot, the diffusion of electronic business capabilities is broad: e-buying and 
e-selling takes place in every manufacturing subsector and along the entire size distribution. Yet it is not 
terribly deep: only 29% of plants are estimated to either place or accept orders over the internet (Table 1). 
Table 1.  Adoption of E-Buying and E-Selling in US Manufacturing 
Internet-based E-business 
Practice 





E-buying or E-selling  29% 
E-buying & E-selling  6% 
  These high-level summary statistics mask a great deal of heterogeneity in the use of internet 
technology. Industries vary significantly in the prevalence of e-commerce is (details available upon 
request). Computers & Electronics and the Printing industry have the highest penetration. In the former, 
roughly 38% of plants place and 21% accept internet orders; in the latter, the percentages are 32% and 
34% for buying and selling, respectively. Apparel is a trailing industry with just around 7% for both e-
buying and e-selling. Some industries lean considerably more towards one e-business practice than the 
other. Only 6% of Textile Products plants place internet orders, but over 16% accept them. 
Another important difference between e-buying and e-selling in the sample concerns the fact that 
the activities captured by the survey do not represent mirror images of the same transactions. The 
suppliers of MRO goods to manufacturing plants are not manufacturing firms themselves, but wholesale 
and retail outlets that sell a range of MRO products (e.g., Office Depot for paper and pens, Grainger for 
lubricants and batteries, etc.).  Thus, the supplier-side of the e-buying transaction is not included in the 
manufacturing-based survey frame. Likewise, the distributors, wholesalers and retailers who typically 
make up the customer-side of the e-selling transaction also lie outside the manufacturing sector. (See 
Figure 1, which graphs the buying and selling transactions along the supply chain, with a rectangle 
                                                      
5 A useful feature of this definition is that it excludes establishments that are merely experimenting with internet-
based processes while still relying primarily on a different network (such as an intranet, extranet, or EDI) for its 
online transactions. This will reduce the likelihood of confounding borderline adoption or exploratory pilot projects 
with true business process innovation requiring substantial investment and co-invention by adopters. 
 
6 Estimates calculated using the Census Bureau’s ASM sampling weights.    16
framing the part of the chain sampled in the Census survey.). Thus, the e-buying and e-selling activities in 
this study concerned completely separate firm activities (though not necessarily independent investment 
decisions, which I address in the econometric model in the next section). 
Figure 1. Differences between E-Buying and E-selling in the Census Survey 
 
Solid arrows represent electronic transactions that were feasible between supply chain members at the time: e-
buying of MRO goods and e-selling for final goods, as described in section 4. The empty arrows for direct goods 
signify the lack of commercially available direct procurement software solutions in the late 1990s. Direct 
procurement and sales took place in some fashion among manufacturing firms, but not using commercially available 
IT solutions.  The frame around the manufacturing sector captures the fact that the survey does not cover the sell-
side of the MRO e-buying transaction or the buy-side of the final goods e-selling transaction. Due to these 
restrictions on electronic business solutions at the time and manufacturing-centric sample, e-buying and e-selling 
thus represented completely separate business processes in the CNUS survey. 
5.2 Market  Leadership   
  The main explanatory variable is market share of the adopting organization. I leverage the 1997 
Census of Manufactures (CMF)
7 to accurately measure the value of shipments in each industry
8 and the 
share of that value shipped by each plant. I also calculate market share of the parent firm, defined for each 
plant as the percentage of country-wide value shipped from all plants belonging to the same firm to which 
the plant of interest belongs. To capture the underlying “quality” of the firm, I also calculate the relative 
total factor productivity of the establishment, assigning a dummy variable equal to one if it is in the top 
20% of its NAICS4 industry. 
5.3  Firm Characteristics Associated with Complexity and Interdependence 
Because the internal coordination challenge is likely to increase both with the number of distinct 
establishments and with the number of product lines produced throughout the firm, I take advantage of 
                                                      
7 Conducted every five years by the US Census Bureau, this survey captures the value of all shipments from nearly 
all manufacturing plants in the country. 
8 I define the relevant market by the 4-digit NAICS code flagged as the primary product for each plant of interest.  
Note that all core results are robust to using a 6-digit NAICS industry definition controls (see Section 7).   17
the 1997 CMF to construct measures for both of these. While the CMF does not capture non-
manufacturing establishments belonging to the parent firm, I proxy for coordination costs generated by 
geographic dispersion with the number of distinct manufacturing plants belonging to the parent firm. The 
coordination required by inter-product dependencies is captured using a count of the distinct product lines 
(at the 7-digit NAICS level) produced by the firm. 
The 1997 CMF also asks respondents to estimate the value of goods and services destined for 
other establishments within the same firm. I calculate the firm-wide value of these inter-plant transfers to 
estimate the economic value to the firm associated with this operationally interdependent production. 
Details and descriptive statistics for all variables are provided in Table 2. 
6.   Empirical Model 
6.1     Bivariate Probit Model of Adoption 
I employ a bivariate probit model of adoption to address the discrete nature of the adoption 
question on the survey and the possibility that the two choices are correlated (for instance by sharing 
hardware investments in servers and routers). Such a model assumes that a particular plant will adopt 
internet-based buying (B) or selling (S) if the net benefits (NB) of doing so are greater than 0. Thus, the 
probability of plant i adopting electronic practice j where    , j BS   is captured by: 
  Pr( 1) Pr ( , ) ) 0 iB i i iB aN B M S X      and 
  Pr( 1) Pr ( , ) ) 0 iS i i iS aN B M S X      
where net benefits are expressed as a function of market share ( i MS ), a vector of other establishment, 
firm, and industry characteristics that influence e-commerce adoption ( i X ), as well as an unobserved 
error term that can be different for each technology ( ij  ). Because establishments have the same 
observable characteristics for each equation, it is reasonable to worry that the unobservable characteristics 
might be also be correlated across the two technologies (i.e.,  (,)0 iE iS corr    ). Bivariate probit 
estimation has the desirable property of allowing for flexible correlation patterns between the error terms 
and explicitly testing whether they are correlated in the data.
 9   
This treatment looks at whether or not adoption has taken place by a particular date and does not 
model the change in adoption status over time. The implicit behavioral assumption of such probit models 
                                                      
9 Specifically, if 
2 0I I
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, it estimates a coefficient for  .   18
of adoption (David 1969) is that establishments with higher net benefits of adopting will adopt first and 
that non-adoption in the cross section captures relatively lower net benefit from adopting the technology. 
6.2     Identification 
The core of my research design is to examine the adoption behavior of the same firms at the same 
time to two innovations that are remarkably similar along many dimensions, but that vary in the specific 
ways that allow them to be classified as either incremental or radical business process innovations. The 
advantage of this approach is the ability to control for potentially confounding influences such as 
unobserved firm-specific “taste” for innovation. A given firm that is disproportionately likely to adopt 
any kind of new technology will bias the results towards adoption of both e-buying and e-selling. A 
technology laggard will have an equivalent negative effect on both technologies. Thus, it is the difference 
in leadership effects between the two technologies that identifies the effect of interest.  
Statistically, identification in this model further requires that market share and other explanatory 
variables not be simultaneously determined with adoption. To mitigate this common concern (Gilbert 
2006), I use lagged values of all explanatory variables to reduce simultaneity. Moreover, I include a rich 
set of controls for possible drivers of IT adoption that might confound the empirical results. For example, 
prior research finds strong correlations between IT adoption and the number of employees and firm age 
(Forman and Goldfarb 2006) as well as complementary skilled labor (Bresnahan et al. 2002). In addition, 
establishments belonging to multi-unit firms may have access to additional resources that could influence 
the investment decision (Forman et al. 2008). To address the possibility that decisions for establishments 
within the same firm may be correlated, all standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Unobserved 
effects arising from specific industry contexts are addressed by the inclusion of a rich set of industry 
dummies. 
7. Results 
7.1  E-buying vs. E-selling 
Tables 4-6 report the average marginal effects of the bivariate probit analyses. They reveal a 
robust positive correlation between market leadership and e-buying, with an equally robust negative 
correlation between leadership and e-selling, supporting both of the main hypotheses. The appropriateness 
of the bivariate probit model is confirmed by a consistently significant coefficient on , which captures 
the degree of correlation between the technology-plant-specific error terms. 
E-Buying 
According to the average marginal effects reported in Table 4, incumbents with greater logged 
market share were far more likely to purchase indirect goods and services over the internet. All else equal,   19
an increase in a plant’s share of the product market by one standard deviation is associated with a 3-6 
percentage-point increase in the likelihood of adoption from the average rate of 21%. At the mean, this 
represents an 18-27% increase in the likelihood of internet-based buying.
10 Similar results (not shown) are 
found for alternative measures of market leadership such as sales and profits. 
The top panel of Figure 2 illustrates how the effect in column 2a of Table 4 varies over the 
surface of market share values.
11 It depicts a monotonic increase in the effect of market share, from a low 
of roughly one percentage point (or a 7% increase) to a high of over 9 percentage points (a 43% increase).  
 The specifications reported in columns 3a and 5a of Table 4 examine the effect of the parent 
firm’s market position. The results are similar, though of somewhat smaller magnitude. 
  This pattern of results supports the hypothesis that there exist strong economies of scale in e-
buying of indirect goods. Furthermore, it is consistent with the notion that the adjustment costs and risks 
associated with this incremental innovation were not disproportionately higher for the largest firms, 
giving them distinct advantages in adoption. 
E-Selling 
The opposite pattern emerges for e-selling. Average marginal effects presented in Table 4 
indicate that a one-standard-deviation increase in a plant’s market share is associated with a 2.2-3.5 
percentage point decrease in the likelihood of e-selling. At the mean adoption of 14.6%, this represents a 
16-24% decrease in probability. A similar effect is seen for the market share of the plant’s parent firm and 
other measures of market leadership (i.e., sales and profits – not shown). 
  The lower panel of Figure 2 shows the distribution of effects across the surface of logged market 
share for column 2b in Table 4. Notably, as market share of the establishment increases, its negative 
impact on e-selling diminishes. This makes sense if economies of scale also apply in e-selling and 
actually start to overcome the effect of higher adjustment costs in determining the net benefits for the very 
largest firms. At the mean however, the organizational costs and risks dominate these scale advantages. 
7.2   Omitted IT Capabilities 
As mentioned in Section 2, certain “competence-enhancing” innovations (Tushman and Anderson 
1986), while requiring substantially new technical knowledge, may nevertheless successfully align with 
the existing competencies, capabilities, and assets of leading firms. This highlights the need for careful 
consideration of a firm’s prior investments in related capabilities – particularly in the case of radical 
                                                      
10 The magnitude of this effect is calculated by multiplying the average marginal effect by the estimated standard 
deviation of the variable and then dividing by the baseline adoption rate for the technology. For column 1a of Table 
4, this is (.022 X 1.75)/.21, or 18%. 
11 Arbitrary values are reported. The precise range of the variable is not approved for disclosure by the Census 
Bureau, as endpoints represent values for individual establishments in the sample.   20
innovation. In the particular case of IT-based process innovations, one can think about implementations of 
other complex, large-scale IT applications as investments in an organization’s co-invention capabilities. 
Prior research in information systems refers to this as “lowering the knowledge barrier” for IT adoption 
(Attewell 1992, Fichman and Kemerer 1997). A useful proxy for this is the presence of Enterprise 
Resource Planning (ERP) applications, which are notoriously difficult to implement due to their impact 
on a wide range of complex and interdependent business practices – and whose presence is believed to 
boost the return to investments in e-commerce applications (AMR 1999b). 
An additional concern centers on the potentially confounding effects of electronic data 
interchange (EDI) adoption. If larger firms are more likely to have legacy EDI systems (for instance, due 
to economies of scale in adoption), and EDI substitutes for internet-based B2B transactions, a negative 
correlation between size and e-selling adoption could be spuriously generated by this relationship.  
Table 5 presents the coefficients on dummy variables indicating whether the establishment 
reports having fully-integrated ERP or an EDI network in place. These are not ubiquitous technologies in 
1999: only 15% of establishments report having ERP and roughly 14% have EDI. However, the impact of 
these other IT investments on e-buying adoption is significant. The presence of an ERP “backbone” at the 
establishment boosts the likelihood of e-buying adoption by nearly 23% (column 1a). EDI has a similar 
positive effect, suggesting that little indirect procurement was taking place over legacy EDI systems or 
that there were low or no switching costs.
12  
The impact of ERP on e-selling is a bit ambiguous. Column 1b reports no effect, while column 3b 
suggests that it might have a marginally positive impact (a 7% positive correlation at the 11% significance 
level). It is surprising that this effect is not greater, given analysts’ emphasis of the role of ERP in 
enabling B2B transactions (e.g., AMR 1999b). One possible interpretation is that the internally-focused 
demands of ERP implementation are qualitatively different from the inter-firm coordination and co-
invention challenges of e-selling, making ERP a poor enabler or “training ground” for innovation that 
spans firm boundaries.  
The negative impact of EDI on e-selling, in contrast, is striking. This indicates that EDI-based 
selling represents a viable substitute with non-trivial switching costs for these B2B transactions. Column 
2b of Table 5 reports a greater than 5-point drop in the e-selling probability, representing a 38% 
reduction. However, the effect of including the EDI variable on the estimated effect of plant market share 
is insignificant, leaving the core empirical findings intact. 
Another potential source of bias would be other related firm capabilities that are not embodied in 
these prior IT investments. To address the possibility that leading firms might simply have stronger 
                                                      
12 Interaction effects between market share variables and IT dummies are never significantly different from zero, 
likely due to the high positive correlation between market share and adoption of both ERP and EDI (not shown). 
This finding holds in the linear probability model, as well. Results available upon request.   21
complementary capabilities, I control for total factor productivity at the plant. This should capture 
unobserved technology or managerial skill that may contribute to plant success while also influencing the 
e-business investment decision. Lack of significant results in Table 5 alleviates this concern. 
7.3   Heterogeneity in Use Matters  
  The point estimates for both e-buying and e-selling are quite stable across a range of 
specifications, reinforcing the robustness of these findings. However, the results are not robust to certain 
definitions of the dependent variable.  In particular, a naïve regression of market share on “e-commerce”, 
defined as either e-buying or e-selling (or both) over the internet, shows no significant relationship 
between the logged market share of the plant and adoption (not shown). Thus, important differences in 
how firms actually use the internet for their business needs would have been completely obscured without 
careful treatment of the different demands of the two e-business innovations.  
Also, even though this paper is focused on the internet-based e-buying and e-selling, the core 
results look very similar when the analysis is run for e-buying or e-selling over any network platform 
(results available upon request). These findings reinforce the notion that it is not the technology platform 
as much as the use of the technology that matters. 
7.4 Complexity 
Thus far, the results are consistent with the argument that e-selling constituted a radical 
innovation with disproportionate economic and organizational risks for leading firms. The theoretical 
framework emphasizes the role that business process complexity plays in driving this relationship. 
Support for this explanation is found in the coefficient on the multi-unit flag: belonging to a firm 
consisting of more than one plant reduces the likelihood of e-selling adoption by 2.3 to 3.7 percentage 
points, representing a 16-25% decrease in the e-selling probability (Table 4). Further corroboration for 
Hypothesis 2a can be found in the coefficients on the log of the number of plants and on the number of 
products associated with the parent firm (columns 1b and 2b of Table 6). An increase in former by one 
standard deviation reduces the likelihood of e-selling by approximately 6%. An equivalent increase in the 
latter reduces the e-selling likelihood by 4%. Both of these results are robust to omitting the market share 
variable from the regression.  
7.5 Interdependence 
  The robustness of the classification framework can also be found in the results on the degree of 
operational interdependence of a firm’s productions. Establishments belonging to firms with a one 
standard-deviation greater value of inter-plant transfers have an 8% lower chance of adopting e-selling 
(column 3, Table 6). This is consistent with Hypothesis 2b.    22
7.6 Potentially  Confounding  Competitive  Effects 
An alternative explanation that predicts a negative correlation between process innovation and 
market leadership with no reference to the alignment between firm capabilities and technology 
requirements rests on the “replacement effects” hypothesized in Arrow’s (1962) seminal work. In this 
model, because market leaders enjoy higher rents from each unit of sales, they face a higher opportunity 
cost of innovating. Importantly, protection from competitive pressure is necessary for this result to hold in 
a dynamic setting (Gilbert and Newbery 1982).  
Despite the inclusion of industry controls, it is conceivable that large potential adopters of e-
selling happen to be in markets with less competition, which would allow for these replacement effects 
(and hence, a lower likelihood of adoption) to manifest without the presence of the economic and 
organizational risks that are central to my hypotheses. To test for the possibility that this alternative 
explanation is driving the results, I follow Aghion et al. (2005), in approximating a Lerner index to 
capture the intensity of competition in the different product markets.
13  
 The Lerner index is ideally price minus marginal cost over price. Because actual margins and 
product prices are unobserved even in the rich Census data, I approximate them with a measure of profits 
over sales. Specifically, I divide the difference between sales and production costs (materials and wages) 
by total sales and subtract from one: 1- 
(sales- cost of materials-wages)
sales
. A higher Lerner index is 
assumed to represent a greater level of produce market competition (and hence lower margins). To avoid 
bias caused by short-term market fluctuations or empirical outliers, I take the value-weighted average of 
this measure for each industry over the past 10 years, where industry defined by a 4-digit SIC code.
14  
The results in Table 7, however, contain no evidence that variation in competitive pressure is 
correlated with variation in the market share coefficient in the adoption regressions. The direct coefficient 
on the Lerner index is not significantly different from zero in column 1a, nor does the effect of the plant’s 
market share vary across different values of the Lerner index. The point estimate for the market share 
coefficient is robust to inclusion of the Lerner index (columns 2a and 2b). This “non-result” may be 
attributable to the identification challenges posed by trying to estimate the effect of product market 
competition while controlling for industry fixed effects (column 1a includes controls for the plant’s 2-
digit SIC code). When industry dummies are removed from the model (columns 3a & 3b), the coefficient 
becomes significant (and, somewhat surprisingly, negative
15), but the market-share coefficient loses its 
                                                      
13 While concentration ratios or a Herfindahl index are more commonly used in empirical work, they have the 
disadvantage of being correlated by definition with market share. 
14 Census shifted from the SIC classification to NAICS for the first time in 1997, so SIC is used for consistency. 
15 This is contrary to prior empirical findings of a positive correlation between product market competition and 
innovation (e.g., Blundell et al. 1999).   23
precision. A similar lack of variation associated with competitive effects is found when a traditional 
Herfindahl index or 4-firm concentration ratio are used instead (results not shown). Thus, it is difficult to 
believe that competitive effects provide a compelling alternative explanation for the empirical results. 
8.  Discussion and Conclusion 
This goal of this paper has been to deepen our understanding of how alignment between the 
demands of new technologies and the capabilities of firms of different sizes influences the distribution of 
innovative activity within a market. A rich strategy and innovation theory literature has returned to this 
question time and again, but the scope of the theory has remained unclear and robust multi-industry 
empirical evidence has, to date, been difficult to acquire. This paper makes progress on both fronts. 
On the theory side, it contributes a new conceptual framework that extends the literature into the 
understudied but important area of business process innovation and clarifies how existing notions of 
“incremental” vs. “radical” innovation may be applied to this class of innovations. A principal advantage 
of this framework is that it maps out the precise mechanisms by which larger firms might excel at 
incremental innovation yet falter in the face of radical change. While the core predictions are not new, 
making the behavioral linkages more explicit clarifies how and to what extent we can extrapolate the 
well-established intuition into this novel setting. In addition, the added precision supports empirical tests 
of the proposed behavioral mechanisms, reinforcing the value of the theoretical foundation.  
The empirical contribution comes from applying this framework to an extraordinarily rich setting with 
data on specific uses of new internet technologies across a range of industries. 
A careful side-by-side comparison of e-buying and e-selling adoption yields robust, multi-
industry evidence consistent with the prediction that large firms will embrace incremental business 
process innovation but will face disproportionate risks and adjustment costs when the proposed change is 
more radical. Moreover, support for the behavioral mechanism detailed in the theoretical framework is 
also forthcoming from the data. The impact of complexity is seen in a negative relationship between e-
selling adoption and greater firm dispersion across distinct locations or product markets. The importance 
of interdependence is reflected in the effect that more-integrated production has in reducing the likelihood 
of e-selling. These findings reinforce the notion that a willingness or ability to pursue business process 
innovation depends on characteristics of both the innovation and the firm:  it is the alignment between the 
two that ultimately determines overall adoption patterns.  
Leveraging data collected by the U.S. Census Bureau overcomes many empirical challenges 
common to this type of investigation.  Yet, certain drawbacks of the empirical setting must be 
acknowledged. While being both rich and expansive in terms of the number of observations and industry 
variation, it is limited to a single year of data. This prevents exploration into the precise timing of   24
investment decisions. Moreover, the CNUS survey only reports on firm behavior during an early stage of 
commercial internet diffusion– leaving open the question of how these effects might evolve as technology 
becomes more mature and/or adoption becomes more widespread.  
In general, innovative activity focused on improving business processes warrants further attention 
by both theorists and empirical scholars. The vast majority of prior strategy and innovation research has 
focused on product innovation, paying short shrift to the costly and important developments that take 
place “inside the black box” (Rosenberg, 1982) of the firm to boost productivity and competitiveness 
during technological change. Understanding the competitive implications of these new technologies and 
how firms address them is a growing imperative in the wired economy. 
This paper takes a step in meeting this need, shedding light on important strategic considerations 
for both adopters and producers of new business process technologies. On the adoption side, my findings 
indicate that, in cases where firms must coordinate complex and interdependent activities throughout a 
larger organization, across more establishments – particularly while impacting customer interactions, 
adoption will tend to take place primarily among smaller firms. These co-invention capabilities may be 
more challenging for large firms to develop; yet they represent an important competitive advantage as 
technology becomes increasingly integrated into the operating processes of firms. In addition, the inter-
firm coordination challenge looms large as businesses grow ever more dependent on the performance of 
their extended value chain. Smaller firms may enjoy new opportunities to leapfrog their larger 
competitors through business-to-business process innovation. 
These findings also have important implications for producers of new technologies and for the 
direction of technological change. If the largest, most powerful adopters in a market resist certain types of 
technological innovations (i.e., radical ones), this may slow the ultimate diffusion of breakthrough 
discoveries and/or skew the incentives of producers towards more incremental advances. At the same 
time, the possibility that firms of different sizes might differentially adopt general purpose technologies 
(i.e., some may apply them to incremental changes, while some leverage them for radical advances) 
suggests that producers of technologies with high co-invention potential may find a more diverse and 
stable customer base for their products.   
The findings presented here can only hint at some of the long-term competitive implications. Yet 
they offer a springboard for future research that may deepen our understanding of the role that alignment 
between different types of innovation and different firm capabilities play in competitive strategy and 
market outcomes during periods of technological change.     25















































































Table 2. Definitions, Means, and Standard Deviations of Variables 
Variable Name  Definition  Mean (est.)†  Std. Dev. (est.)  
E-BUY  = 1 if the plant reports buying primarily over the 




E-SELL  = 1 if the plant reports selling primarily over the 






Plant share of all product market sales in the U.S. 












Firm share of all product market sales in the U.S. 











Change in plant share of SIC4 product market 




LN_EMP  Log of total employees at the plant in 1997  3.51 
(.012) 
1.22 





LN_SALES  Log of plant total revenues in 1997  8.20 
(.017) 
1.60 
AGE<10  =1 if the plant is 10 or fewer years old; 0 else  .287 
(.005) 
.453 





SKILLMIX  Share of non-production worker wages to total 









ERP  =1 if plant has a fully-integrated Enterprise 




LERNER  1 minus the profit-to-sales ratio  .695 
(.007) 
.069 
NUM PLANTS  Number of manufacturing plants belonging to the 






Log of the number of manufacturing plants 






Number of products (defined by NAICS7) 







Estimated value of goods and services shipped to 




†Standard errors in parentheses.  27





























1                        
Firm Market 
Share 
.808 1                       
Logged 
Employees 
.770 .604  1                     
Multi-Unit 
Flag 
  .491  .677  .441  1                   
Skill Mix  -.084 
 
-.163 -.074 -.139 1                 
Age<10 -.148 
 
-.090 -.181 -.048  -.036 1               
Logged 
Sales 
.878 .761  .861  .551 -.040 -.161  1             
Logged 
Profit 
.805 .696  .789  .512 -.033 -.142  .919  1           
Top 20% 
TFP 
.053 .061  -.075  .049 -.063 .041  .053  .215  1         
Num Plants  .205  .545  .130  .413  -.136  -.027  .254  .225  .034  1       
# Firm 
Products 




.163 .230  .194  .116 -.098 -.024  .225  .190 .024  .260  .272  1   
Lerner .007  -.008 -.032 -.050  -.141  .010  -.023  -.149  -.008  -.006 -.013  .053  1   28









































































































(86  NAICS4 
Dummies) 












N  ~35K ~35K ~35K ~35K ~35K 
Wald Χ
2  198.62  4989.98 9317.15 5677.89 7967.69 
Degrees  of  Freedom  2  178 178 180 180 
 
Weighted maximum-likelihood bivariate probit estimation, reporting estimated average marginal effects for continuous variables and discrete 
change from 0 to 1 for dummy variables.  Robust standard errors are clustered by firm and included in parentheses. Significance levels are denoted 
as follows: *10%, **5%, ***1%.  29
Table 5. Bivariate Probit Estimates  
Effects of other Information Technology Investments Total Factor Productivity 
 



































































































































ρ  .404 .403 .409 .398 
N  ~32K ~35K ~32K ~35K 
Wald Χ
2  7662.33 3678.22 7671.27 5733.28 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
182 182 184 182 
 
Weighted maximum-likelihood bivariate probit estimation, reporting estimated average marginal 
effects for continuous variables and discrete change from 0 to 1 for dummy variables.  Robust standard 
errors are clustered by firm and are included in parentheses. Significance levels are denoted as follows: 
†11%, *10%, **5%, ***1%. The baseline adoption of ERP in the sample is 15.2% (estimated using 
sampling weights); EDI adoption is estimated at 13.9% of the overall sample. 
    30
Table 6. Bivariate Probit Estimates: Organizational and Operational Complexity and 
Interdependence 
 










































    
# FIRM 
PRODUCTS 








       -2.25  x  10
-10  -1.50 x 10
-8** 












































N ~35K  ~33K  ~35K 
Wald Χ
2  7723.60 9191.79  5711.83 
Degrees of Freedom  180  182  182 
 
Weighted maximum-likelihood bivariate probit estimation, reporting estimated average marginal effects 
for continuous variables and discrete change from 0 to 1 for dummy variables.  Robust standard errors are 
clustered by firm and are included in parentheses. Significance levels are denoted as follows: †11%, 
*10%, **5%, ***1%.  
    31
Table 7. Competition Effects 
  Weighted Lerner index  




index (no industry 
controls) 































@ Lerner = 0    .009*** 
(.003) 
  -.009*** 
(.003) 
      
@ Lerner = .25    .009*** 
(.003) 
  -.008*** 
(.003) 
      
@ Lerner = .5    .010*** 
(.003) 
  -.007*** 
(.002) 
      
@ Lerner = .75    .010*** 
(.003) 
  -.006*** 
(.002) 
      
@ Lerner = 1    .010*** 
(.003) 
  -.006*** 
(.002) 


































































N ~35K  ~35K  ~35K 
Wald Χ
2  4241.89 5810.71  520.05 
Deg. of Freedom  50  48  12 
 
Weighted maximum-likelihood bivariate probit estimation, reporting estimated average marginal effects for continuous 
variables and discrete change from 0 to 1 for dummy variables.  Details of how market share effects vary across the 
surface of the appropriate Lerner index (defined at the NAICS4 industry level) are reported at the following values: 0, 
.25, .5, .75, and 1. These values are arbitrary and may not even represent actual values in the data. They are provided for 
illustrative purposes only. Robust standard errors are clustered by firm and are included in parentheses. Significance 
levels are denoted as follows: *10%, **5%, ***1%.   32
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